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THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PASSIVE
MINORITY EQUITY INTERESTS: REPLY
P. O'BRIEN
STEVEN C. SALOP*

DANIEL

I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article published in thisjournal,Jon Dubrow examines the
acquisitions of passive minority equity interests. l The focus of his article
is the treatment of these transactions by the courts and the federal
antitrust agencies, including their treatment of the investment-only
exemption from Section 7 of the Clayton Act. One section of the article
discusses the economic foundation for the competitive effects analysis
of these acquisitions, focusing mainly on our article recently published
in this journal. 2 Dubrow accepts the basic economic framework set out
in our earlier article, and the analysis of factors that affect the acquiring
firm's control or influence over the target.
However, Dubrow is highly critical of our treatment of the financial
interest of the acquiring firm and particularly the partial ownership
scenario that we refer to as "silent financial interest." He argues that our

* Daniel O'Brien is Deputy Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade
Commission. Steven Salop is Professor of Economics and Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center and Senior Consultant to Charles River Associates. We would like to thank
Debra Holt, Henry Huser, Serge Moresi, and John Woodbury for helpful conversations
on these issues. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not purport
to represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any Commissioner.
1 Jon B. Dubrow, Challenging the Economic Incentives Analysis of Competitive Effects in Acquisitions of Passive Minority Equity Interests, 69 ANTITRUST LJ. 113 (2001).
2 Daniel P. O'Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Oumcrship: Financial
Interest and Corpurate Control, 67 ANTITRUST LJ. 559 (2000). See also RobertJ. Reynolds &
Bruce R. Snapp, The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures, 4 INT'L
J. INDUS. ORG. 141 (June 1986); Timothy F. Bresnahan & Stephen C. Salop, QJ.tantifYing
the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 155 (June 1986);
David A. Malueg, Collusive Behavior and Partial Ownership of Rivals, EAG 90-9 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice Econ. Analysis Group Discussion Paper 1990); Joseph Farrell & Carl
Shapiro, Asset Oumcrship and Market Structure in Oligopoly, 21 RAND J. ECON. 275, 287 (1990);
A.E. Rodriguez, Some Antitrust Concerns of Partial Equity Acquisitions 15 (Bureau of
Econ. FTC Working Paper No. 186, 1991);John E. Kwoka,Jr., The Output and Projit Effects
of HorizontalJoint Ventures, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 325-38 (Sept. 1992); Ian Gale, Price Competition
in Non CovperativeJoint Ventures, 12 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG., Mar. 1994, at 53.
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financial interest analysis ignores several important "real-world" complicating factors that significantly reduce or even eliminate the economic
incentives of the acquiring firm to reduce its competitive intensity following the acquisition of a passive minority financial interest. In this reply,
we respond to Dubrow's criticisms and present our view of how such
complicating factors should be reckoned into the analysis.
II. OUR FRAMEWORK AND QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY
Our article starts from the premise that a partial ownership interest
involves two distinct elements-financial interest and control/influence
rights. The acquiring firm's financial interest entitles that firm to a share
of the profits and value of the target firm. That financial interest affects
the competitive incentives and decisions of the acquiring firm. The
acquiring firm also may obtain the ability to influence or even control the
target. These control/influence rights allow it to affect the competitive
incentives and decisions of the acquired firm.
A partial ownership transaction that gives the acquiring firm a particular financial interest share may be accompanied by more or less control/
influence rights. For example, a 49 percent financial interest gives considerable influence and control if the next-largest shareholder has a 5
percent interest, but much less (if any) control if another shareholder
has a 51 percent interest. In addition, in modern corporate finance with
multiple classes of stock and complex voting rules, the voting share
does not necessarily equal the share of financial interest. Indeed, a
shareholder could have substantial financial interest share but be relegated to a passive ownership position, with virtually no control/influence
beyond what is given by corporate and securities laws. 3 Antitrust consent
decrees also could reduce or eliminate the shareholder's influence. 4
The residual rights provided by corporate and securities laws raise the
question of whether most real-world partial ownership interests are or
ever could be purely passive as a practical matter, absent a formal sideagreement or consent decree. 5 Absent a side-agreement, minority shareEven these "default" rights may be altered by private contracts in some cases.
4 For example, in the case of TCl's financial interest in Time Warner, an FTC consent
decree eliminated TCl's ability to influence Time Warner's competitive decisions. See
Time Warner, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3709 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1997).
5 For example, in the Northwest/Continental matter, Northwest placed its stock into
a 6-year (and then a 10-year) voting trust in an attempt to satisfY Department of Justice
concerns about its control over Continental. However, DOJ concluded that Northwest
would retain important residual rights that would give it significant influence over Continental. See United States of America v. Northwest Airlines Corp., http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/cases.
3
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holders sometimes have the right to bring stockholder mismanagement
suits against the management of the target, suits that can be used to
exert some influence over the target firm.6
If the minority shareholding is small, it might be thought that the
incentive to bring such mismanagement suits would be small. This is
because the plaintiff bears the full cost of the suit but only gets a fraction
of the benefits. However, when the shareholder is a competitor, there
is a powerful force in the other direction. If the acquiring firm can sue
or threaten to sue to influence the target to compete less intensely, then
a lower financial interest share means that the reduction in the target's
profits is borne mainly by the other shareholders, while the acquiring
firm gets the benefit of less intense competition. We discuss this latter
"free rider" issue in detail in our "Total Control" scenario. 7 For this
reason, the pure passivity inherent in our "silent financial interest" scenario may best be viewed as a limiting case, absent credible evidence
regarding the inability or disincentive to bring mismanagement suits.
Our economic analysis of the incentive effects of passive minority
financial interest follows the standard economic analysis of unilateral
incentive effects. s If a firm acquires a purely passive financial interest in
a competitor, with absolutely no control or influence, it will recognize
that the target's incentives will remain the same as before the acquisition.
However, in making its own competitive decisions about its price, output,
and investment, it will take into account the impact of the financial
interest on its own incentives. Instead of trying to maximize solely its
own profits, it will try to maximize the sum of its own profits, plus the
investment income earned from its financial interest in the target. That
investment income equals, in the simplest case, the profits of the target
times the acquired firm's financial interest share of the target. Formally,
this can be written as
(1)
6 A current example is LVMH's ongoing mismanagement lawsuit before the Dutch
courts attacking Cucci's 1999 decision to form a strategic alliance with PPR. Cucci alleges
that this strategic alliance has enabled it to pursue a more aggressive competitive strategy
against LVMH and its other competitors. See LVMH Commences Legal Action Against
Cucci Poison Pill Mechanism, LVMH Press Release, http://www.lvrnh.com (Feb. 25, 1999);
LVMH Legal Action Against Cucci and PPR and Warns Against Implementation of Strategic
InvestmentAgreement, LVMH Press Release, http://www.lvrnh.com (june 9,1999); LVMH
Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA and others v. Cucci Croup NY and others, Enterprise
Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Case No. 167/990K
7 O'Brien & Salop, supra note 2, at 578.
B In economic language, "unilateral effects" refer to competitive effects that arise
through the adjustment from one (non-collusive) equilibrium to another following a
merger or partial acquisition.
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where W represents the wealth of the acquiring firm, ITA represents the
profits of the acquiring firm, ITT represents the profits of the target, and
B represents the acquiring firm's financial interest share in the target.
When the acquiring firm takes its investment income into account, its
competitive incentives will change. For example, in making its own pricing decision, it will recognize that an increase in its own price will
lead some of its customers to substitute to purchasing from the target,
increasing the sales and profits of the target. As a shareholder in the
target, the acquiring firm is able to share in the resulting increased
profits and/or capital gains on its stock ownership. This fact leads the
acquiring firm to have an incentive to pull its competitive punches,
relative to its incentives absent the acquisition. The magnitude of this
effect on its incentives depends on the magnitude of the financial interest
and the impact of this substitution on the profitability of the target firm.
A complete competitive effects analysis of a partial ownership acquisition
also would involve evaluation of easy of entry, efficiency benefits, and
other competitive effects factors.
Our earlier article explains how to quantify this incentive effect, based
on the type of data generally collected in the course of a Hart-ScottRodino premerger review. We explain how the basic HHI methodology
can be applied and a modified HHI (MHHI) can be derived that takes
the partial ownership interest into account. In the case of a passive (or
"silent") financial interest, the MHHI "delta" equals the financial interest
share (B) times the product of the firms' market shares. This may be
compared to a full merger, where the MHHI "delta" equals twice the
product of the firms' market shares.
To illustrate using Dubrow's numerical example, suppose that GM
buys a 45 percent silent financial interest in Ford. Suppose that minivans
constitute a relevant market and GM's and Ford's market shares are 20
percent each. In that case, a merger between GM and Ford would increase
the HHI by 800 points (i.e., 2 x 20 x 20). In contrast, GM's acquisition
of the 45 percent passive financial interest would increase the MHHI by
only 180 points (i.e., 45 percent x 20 x 20).
Our article also derives a second methodology, the Price Pressure
Index (PPI). This methodology also relates to the analytic foundation
of the Merger Guidelines's section on unilateral effects in differentiated
products markets. In contrast to the MHHI, which is a market-wide index,
there is a separate PPI for each of the merging firms. The PPIs depend
on diversion ratios and margins earned by the firms, as well as the
financial interest share.
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We also briefly discuss how merger-specific efficiencies generated by
the transaction can be incorporated into the PPI methodology, and how
the PPI can be combined with a merger simulation model to derive what
might be termed an Equilibrium Price Index (EPI) for each firm in the
market. 9 The EPIs take into account all the feedback among market
participants from the partial ownership interest and the mergerspecific efficiencies.
III. THE CRITICISMS OF OUR FINANCIAL
INTEREST ANALYSIS
Dubrow is highly critical of our financial interest analysis. He argues
that we "presume a formulaic level of financial interest and economic
incentives" that is "divorced from real-world factors." These complicating
factors "could render the possibility of competitive harm unlikely." These
complicating factors involve: (1) incomplete information by the managers of the acquiring firm, (2) the personal financial incentives of the
managers of the acquiring firm, and (3) the inability of the acquiring
firm to capture the benefits of its investment. According to Dubrow,
these factors imply that one cannot simply presume that the acquiring
firm will have the incentive to raise price. Instead, one must examine
these "myriad factors ... before one can presume that the investment
in a competitor would, in fact, provide any meaningful incentive to
increase prices or change other competitive behavior."10
These criticisms suggest that these real-world complicating factors
significantly dampen or altogether eliminate the incentives of the acquiring firm to pull its competitive punches. Dubrow is particularly concerned
about the situation where the financial interest is passive. This view in
turn would imply that the agencies and courts should be much more
permissive with respect to acquisitions of passive minority financial interests than would be implied by our quantitative methodology.
We disagree. In addition, as we will discuss below in more detail, a
broad reading of these criticisms might been taken as essentially rejecting
economic incentives analysis across the board. We doubt that Dubrow
intends this broad interpretation. However, given the scope of these
9 There has been considerable work on oligopoly simulations of the price effects of
mergers. For example, see Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products
Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 363-86
(1997); and Luke Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, Simulation the Effects of Mergers Among
Noncooperative Oligopolists, in COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE: MODELING AND
ANALYSIS WITH MATHEMATICA (Hal Varian ed., 1996).
10 For the quotations in this paragraph, see Dubrow, supra note 1, at 131-32.
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criticisms, we think that it is important to explain the flaws in this
interpretation.
We also disagree with most of Dubrow's specific criticisms. We do not
think that they identify issues that can usefully differentiate a case from
the paradigm we set out. However, we are sympathetic to a variant of
one of Dubrow's specific concerns, the one relating to the ability of the
acquiring firm to capture the benefits of its investment. We agree that
the inability to capture benefits can be a dampening influence in certain
circumstances, though our analysis differs substantially from the specific
scenario discussed by Dubrow. Dubrow focuses on market risk. We think
that such a problem instead could arise from the acquiring firm's lack
of control over the target's management, along with a lack of confidence
in their investment possibilities or skills. The dampening effect is more
likely when the financial interest is inherited or obtained for noncompetitive reasons, rather than when it is actively acquired.
In our view, this complicating factor at most may somewhat dampen the
incentives of the managers of the acquiring firm to pull its competitive
punches. However, it would not eliminate the incentives of the acquiring
firm to soften its competitive decisions. We also disagree with the thrust
and the scope of the other criticisms set out in Dubrow's article. Thus,
we con tinue to conclude that the acquisition of passive minority financial
interests can raise significant competitive concerns and that our analysis
provides a valid framework for quantifying the.extent of these concerns.

A.

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

Dubrow says that the most prevalent complicating real-world factor is
incomplete information. In his view, and in contrast to models that
assume executives have a "near omniscient view of the competitive
dynamics," managers in the real world lack sufficient information "to
modify with any degree of precision their own behavior based upon the
effect that such a change is likely to have on the profitability of the rival
in which they have invested."ll The lack of information might involve
an "overall lack of data" or an "unanticipated action" by another firm.12
As a result of this incomplete information, the managers are unlikely to
change their competitive decisions in response to obtaining a passive
financial interest in a competitor.
Before getting to the application of these claims to the analysis of
partial ownership interests, it is worth noting at the outset that these
II

[d. at 133.

12

[d.
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incomplete information criticisms could be read as striking to the heart
of the economic analysis used in antitrust and industrial organization
more generally. Corporate managers clearly face incomplete information. Incomplete information is ubiquitous in the economy. It is also
true that incomplete information affects the incentives and decisions of
risk-averse individuals and firms.
Standard industrial organization economics clearly does not assume
away this incomplete information. Instead, industrial organization economics is premised on the view that managers are able to operate actively
and successfully ir; an environment characterized by incomplete information. The managers are assumed to gather information and make decisions efficiently to maximize expected profits, despite imperfect and
costly information. 13 A rejection of the ability of managers to take into
account and make decisions in response to a significant change in the
corporation's investment portfolio thus represents an extreme (and, we
think, unsupportable) view of imperfect information.
Accepting this sort of incomplete information criticism whole hog
obviously would lead to a dramatic impact on the role of economics in
antitrust. A reader might interpret Dubrow as saying that incomplete
information essentially paralyzes managers to the point of leading them
to forgo profitable investment opportunities and profitable conduct.
This would be a severe managerial overreaction, of course. After all,
the MBAs who manage modern corporations are trained to deal with
incomplete information in their competitive decisions. For example, in
setting price, managers must estimate the impact of the price increase
on the firm's sales and profits. In carrying out this analysis, the impact
of the price increase on rivals' pricing also is relevant and must be
reckoned into the analysis. This analysis and these decisions involve
incomplete information.
This point may be illustrated with Dubrow's example of General
Motors purchasing a partial ownership interest in Ford. Suppose that
IS See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (1997); JEAN TIROLE,
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988) (especially the chapter on the theory
of the firm). Scherer and Ross summarize the rationale for assuming profit maximization
as follows: "It appears that the profit maximization assumption at least provides a good first
approximation in describing business behavior. Deviations, both intended and inadvertent,
undoubtedly exist in abundance, but they are kept within more or less narrow bounds by
competitive forces, the self-interest of stock-owning managers, and the threat of managerial
displacement by important outside stockholders and takeovers." F.M. Scherer & David
Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 52 (3d ed. 1990).
For a recent review of the role of decision theory in business and judicial decision making,
see C. Frederick Becker, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67
ANTITRUST LJ. 41 (1999).
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GM raises its minivan price, expecting a fraction of the lost sales to be
captured by Ford. According to Dubrow, that expectation might be
disappointed if Daimler/Chrysler runs a simultaneous price promotion
and captures all the diverted sales instead. Fearing this, Dubrow suggests
that GM may forgo the price increase.
It surely is true that certain expectations could deter the GM price

increase. However, a full analysis by GM's managers would take into
account the likelihood of this promotional conduct by Daimler/Chrysler
and whether or not GM's initial price increase would cause such a
promotion. In particulaI,', if the price promotion were expected to take
place whether or not GM raises its price, then GM would have already
accounted for its likely sales losses from that promotion in its planning,
independent of the proposed price increase. In evaluating the profitability of its price increase, GM would want to estimate the incremental effect
of its price increase on sales, not the gross loss that combines the price
increase and a simultaneous (but independent) promotion. If GM establishes that the price increase will not cause the Daimler promotion, then
the GM post-acquisition price increase would be less likely to be deterred.
In addition, GM obviously also would factor into its analysis other
possible responses by Daimler/Chrysler, not just this one. In particular,
industrial organization economics would suggest that if GM raised its
price, there is also the possibility that Daimler/Chrysler might be more
likely to raise its prices in response. Indeed, most economists would treat
a price-increase response as far more likely than the opposite factual
scenario assumed by Dubrow. Standard economic models of oligopoly
with differentiated products have the property that a price increase by
one firm tends to lead its rivals to increase their prices in response.
Given this starting point, our PPI and MHHI estimates actually are
conservative, in that they assume that competitors like Daimler/Chrysler
do not raise their prices in response to the GM price increase. 14 Thus,
taking this factor into account might well raise the level of competitive concern.
All in all, incomplete information is a fact of life for corporations and
they deal with it in sophisticated ways. It would not eliminate.the incentive
to increase price or reduce output created by a passive minority financial interest.

14 These induced price increases and other feedbacks would be taken into account in
full equilibrium simulation models that derive EPis.
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MANAGEMENT'S PERSONAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

Dubrow's second real-world complicating factor involves the personal
financial incentives of managers. Dubrow observes that we assume a
"common firm-wide incentive" that he believes is "likely not present in
many industrial structures. "15 In Dubrow's view, corporate managers are
compensated on the basis of the performance of the business they operate, not the overall profitability of the entire corporation. Thus, managers
would not have the personal financial incentive to sacrifice the profits
of their particular business by raising price, even if it increases the
investment income of the firm by even more. Indeed, according to
Dubrow, even the senior corporate managers and the board of directors
would not be willing to sacrifice earnings in order to boost investment
income by more. 16 This "agency" problem thus would mean that a silent
financial interest would not lead the acquiring firm to raise its price or
reduce its output or investment.
We recognize the general potential for agency costs. However, our
framework properly assumes away this specific agency problem in the
analysis of silent financial interest. We have two key reasons for this
assumption.
First, antitrust generally assumes that corporate and securities laws,
along with the market for corporate control, ensure that the senior
managers and board of directors act generally in the interests of shareholders to maximize profits (i.e., the market valuation of the corporation). Thus, we assume that board and senior management take actions
to incentivize lower-level managers to maximize corporate profits. This
may involve monitoring their behavior directly. It also may involve the
design of compensation structure. It is true that managers are compensated on the basis of the performance of their individual businesses.
However, they also are compensated on the basis of corporate profits.
Modern corporations increasingly use stock options to incentivize managers to act in the interests of the entire corporation. For example, we are
confident that the corporate managers at GM make sure that Chevrolet
and Pontiac prices are set in the interest of GM shareholders. To take
a more extreme case, we do not think that the Chevrolet manager
who engages in a comparative advertising campaign that points out the
superiority of value-priced Chevrolets versus overpriced Cadillacs would
be rewarded. Thus, we are comfortable with our general approach of
Dubrow, supra note 1, at 133.
16Id. at 133-34.

15
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assuming away a broad critique based on the personal financial incentives
of managers.
Second, the implications of this broad agency cost criticism go far
beyond the analysis of partial ownership interests. We are confident that
Dubrow is taking a narrow view of the implications of agency costs.
However, readers might not. And, we think, a broad reading would lead
to absurd results. For example, if one were to assume that managers
were interested only in the profits of their specific business and totally
ignored the implications for the corporation, then a merger among GM,
Ford, Toyota, and Daimler/Chrysler would be permissible because it
could be assumed that all the models would be priced independently
by managers with a narrow focus. It similarly could not be presumed
that merger plans were designed on average to increase efficiencyY
Managerial aggrandizement would be the more likely presumption. IS
Indeed, in the extreme, it might no longer be presumed that horizontal
price fixing increases prices to unreasonable levels. Instead, lazy managers simply may be trying to save the effort of setting prices independently.
Or, perhaps the managers are engaged in an elaborate, altruistic potlatch
ritual to benefit their customers by setting beneficial low prices.
Thus, although we accept the potential for certain agency problems
in modern corporations, we are not prepared to say that managers are
so narrowly focused and outside the control of the corporation itself to
deter the type of anticompetitive conduct analyzed in our article.
C. INABILITY TO CAPTURE BENEFITS

Dubrow's third real-world complicating factor involves the inability of
the acquiring firm to capture the benefits earned by the target firm from
I7 This presumption is apparent in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. For example: "the
Agency seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with the larger universe of mergers that
are either competitively beneficial or neutral." U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 13,104. "A merger is unlikely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate
its exercise unless it significantly increases concentration and results in a concentrated
market, properly defined and measured. Mergers that either do not significantly increase
concentration or do not result in a concentrated market ordinarily require no further
analysis." [d. § l.0.
18 Conversely, it could no longer be presumed that a horizontal merger between large
firms in a highly concentrated industry would raise competitive concerns if the combined
operation maintained separate business units run by different managers. The argument
would be that the agency problem is so severe that it would not be possible for the owners
to design incentive contracts that induce managers to maximize the profits of the firm.
Of course, this is tantamount to rejecting a role for antitrust in analyzing the effects of
horizontal mergers.
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conduct by the acquiring firm to pull its competitive punches. 19 Although
we disagree with Dubrow's formulation of the specific situations in which
this inability likely affects incentives, we do agree that this problem can
affect incentives in a different scenario. In the next section, we discuss
our formulation and resolution of this problem.
Dubrow raises this problem in the context of the market risk inherent
in a partial financial interest arrangement. For example, in the case of
multi-product firms, if the competitive overlap involves only a small
fraction of the target's entire business, Dubrow cautions that any benefits
from the financial interest may be swamped by the effects of other
businesses on the overall profitability of the target firm. The return on
the acquiring firm's investment also is affected by the aggregate stock
market risk.
Dubrow observes that we assume that the acquiring firm shares in the
profits of the target firm. Yet, for public companies that do not payout
earnings in the form of dividends, there is no direct and immediate
profit sharing. Instead, the acquiring firm would obtain a capital gain
based on the increased value of the acquired firm, a capital gain that
can only be realized in the future when the financial in terest is liquidated.
At that time, the capital gain may have disappeared from a variety of
other shocks to the company or the economy. Thus, a company would
not sacrifice its profits for a potential capital gain in the other company.
We think that this criticism is highly overstated. As a general matter,
whether the return to the acquiring firm is in the form of dividends or
capital gains flowing from retained earnings, both increase the value of
the acquired firm. Indeed, retained earnings and capital gains are tax
advantaged, so that they should lead to a larger increase in the valuation
of the acquiring firm. In fact, if the acquiring firm does not payout its
profits either, then a price increase would increase the value of the
investment in the target firm while decreasing the stand-alone value of
the division of the acquiring firm. Thus, there is market risk either way.
The shareholders would care about the overall value of their investment,
which would incorporate (and aggregate) both effects.
Nor would some sort of "swamping" or stock market risk issues destroy
the incentives of the acquiring firm to take actions that increase the
profitability of the target. It is true that the target firm's profits are
subject to variation because of other businesses or market risk. However,
if the acquiring firm pulls its competitive punches, the statistical expectation of the target's profits will improve. This higher expectation in turn
19

Dubrow, supra note 1, at 134-36.
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will be reflected in a higher expected stock market valuation or higher
dividends on average.
Variance in the target's profitability does reduce its stock market valuation, ceteris paribus. However, this reduction is independent of the acquiring firm's financial interest. This reduction occurs in the absence of the
financial interest and before the acquisition is made. As a result, that
stock market risk already would be reflected in a lower purchase price
for the acquired financial interest. The market risk thus will not provide
a general deterrent to the acquiring firm raising its price, contrary to
Dubrow's assumption.

IV. LACK OF CONTROL OVER THE TARGET'S
PROFITS AND INVESTMENTS
We disagree with the specifics of Dubrow's formulation of why the
acquiring firm would be unable to recapture the benefits achieved by
the target. However, we agree that a benefits-recapture problem may
arise in certain other circumstances. This does not involve market risk
at all. Instead, it arises because an acquiring firm with a purely passive
financial interest by definition cannot control or influence the way in
which the target uses the extra profits generated by the actions of the
acquiring firm.
When the acquiring firm raises its price after acqumng a passive
financial interest, it trades its own profits for presumably larger returns
earned from its investment in the target. However, this trade also involves
reducing the profits that it controls for profits controlled by the senior
managers of the target. This raises the risk that the managers of the
target may not direct these earnings to their highest value uses, whether
that involves paying them out as dividends or investing them in high
rate of return businesses. In particular, the senior management of the
acquiring firm may feel that they are more skillful investors, who would
earn a higher rate of return than would the managers of the target. The
acquiring firm may have high return investment prospects that they
cannot afford to fund or they may feel that the managers of the target
have a defective investment or business plan. 2o To state this in the
extreme, they may fear that the target's incremental profits will be squandered in corporate jets and excessive salaries.
20 In this regard, modern finance theory recognizes that even weJl functioning capital
markets face moral hazard and adverse selection problems that limit the ability of firms
to borrow. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with

Imperfect Information, 71 AM.

ECON.

REv. 393-410 (1981).
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Under these circumstances, the acquiring firm may be willing to sacrifice some nominal earnings in order to maintain greater control over a
higher fraction of those earnings. Thus, the acquiring firm would be
reluctant to soften its competitive conduct to benefit the target, unless
the increased investment income is large enough to overcome the risk
from loss of control. This can be a valid business concern in a partial
ownership transaction, in particular, when the financial interest is not
actively acquired.
In fact, a variant of this issue arose in the Time Warner acquisition of
Turner Broadcasting. 21 As part of that merger transaction, Time Warner
acquired TCl's 23 percent ownership interest in Turner. In exchange,
Time Warner gave TCI a small financial interest (approximately 7-9
percent, depending on the base used) in Time Warner. This exchange
of shares was not actively acquired by TCI. Instead, TCI only accepted
the exchange because that plan made the transaction tax-free.
Whereas TCI had significant influence in Turner, including board
representation, its financial interest in Time Warner was to be totally
passive in order to satisfy the potential objections of the Federal Trade
Commission. Under these circumstances, the TCI senior managers indicated that they would not have an incentive to sacrifice TCI profits to
increase the profits of Time Warner. Whereas the TCI senior management could control the disposition of the TCI profits, they would have
no influence over the use of the Time Warner profits. Because Time
Warner had a poor investment record at the time relative to TCI, the
claim that TCI could not easily capture the benefits of its investment
had some credibility. In addition, this was not a situation in which TCI
initiated a partial ownership acquisition of Time Warner. Instead, they
received the financial interest when Turner was sold to Time Warner.
These considerations can be easily reckoned into our analysis. If the
managers of the acquiring firm are more skillful investors than the target,
then the acquiring firm would only be willing to raise its price if its
nominal share of the increased profits earned by the target significantly
exceed the profits that it sacrifices. Stated in terms of the profitability
formula above, the acquiring firm would "discount" the increased profits
earned by the target by a "discount rate" to reflect its inability to control
the disposition of these profits. Formally, the acquired firm's perceived
wealth could be rewritten as follows,
21 Stanley M. Besen et aI., Vertical and Horizontal Oumcrship in Cable TV: Time-WamerTurner, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 452-75 (John Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White
eds., 3d ed. 1999).
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where () represents the minority passive ownership discount rate.
Applying this discount rate does not eliminate the incentives of the
acquiring firm to raise its price in order to increase the profits of the
acquired firm. However, it does dampen its incentives to some degree.
As indicated by the equation, the "discount rate" would have the same
effect as a comparable reduction in the acquiring firm's financial interest.
This raises the question of the specific discount rate to apply in calculating the MHHI or PPIs. The appropriate discount rate should reflect the
reduction in value from not having control or influence over the earnings. A rough estimate of the appropriate discount rate could be obtained
from market data on the magnitude of the control premium in equity
acquisitions. These estimates of the price premium of voting over nonvoting stock in public companies fall in the 4-7 percent range, though
this figure does not control for the magnitude of the financial interest. 22
Minority ownership discounts for tax purposes permitted by the Internal
Revenue Service are another possible data source, although these discounts do not necessarily reflect equilibrium rates determined in any
real market. 23 The appropriate discount rate is not a settled issue.
To illustrate the impact of this discount rate on the MHHI calculations,
return to the minivan example set out earlier. In that case, GM's acquisition of a 45 percent passive interest led to an increase of 180 points in
the MHHI. Suppose that a 20 percent discount rate were applied to
account for the fact that GM could not influence Ford's disposition of
the higher profits and the fact that Ford had a poor investment record.
In that case, the MHHI delta now would be 144 points (i.e., 80 percent
x 180). With that discount rate, the transaction would still raise concerns
under the market concentration standards set out in the Merger
Guidelines. 24
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although we disagree with most of Dubrow's criticisms of the impact
of incomplete information on incentives, we do accept an effect based
22 See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Cmpvrate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, J. FIN. ECON. 12. 13, table 3 (Apr. 1983). Of course, the proper premium (or
discount for non-control) would depend on the size of the financial interest and the
magnitude of influence and control the shareholder otherwise would have.
2S The IRS discounts apparently often fall in the 20-40% range. See Lynn Asinof, Family
Limited Partnerships Can Be Dysfunctional, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1996, at Cl.
24 Of course, analysis of concentration and market shares is only one step in the Merger
Guidelines analytic process. A full analysis also would involve analysis of entry and repositioning, competitive effects factors, and efficiencies.
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on a different rationale for the possible inability to capture benefits. If
the acquiring firm is unable to control the target's use of its profits and
potentially recapture its fair share of the higher profits it creates, the
acquiring firm's incentives to sacrifice its profits in order to increase the
profits of the target may be dampened somewhat. Where the seriousness
of this problem can be demonstrated with credible evidence, the MHHIs
and PPIs can be adjusted downward accordingly.
However, it is important to recognize that this factor does not eliminate
the acquiring firm's incentives to pull its competitive punches, but only
dampens them to some extent. This analysis would not justify an exemption from Section 7 or a dramatic increase in antitrust permissiveness
towards passive minority financial interests. 25 Finally, of course, this factor
is greatly weakened or eliminated altogether when the acquiring firm
also has control dr influence over the target.
This raises the question of when and how the acquiring firm can
credibly demonstrate that this inability to capture benefits is significant.
In this regard, evidence that the acquiring firm can exert no influence
over the target clearly would be relevant. Evidence that the target has a
poor investment record also would be relevant. It also would be relevant
if the financial interest were not acquired directly and actively, but rather
were inherited or obtained passively, say as part of a larger transaction.
If the investment were actively obtained, there is less reason to think
that the acquired firm so fears the loss of its investment that it would
forgo otherwise profitable actions to benefit the target. To the contrary,
this real-world factor would provide credible evidence that the acquiring
firm had enough trust in the management of the target to seek out and
acquire the original investment.

25 In this regard, the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines recently issued by DO] and
FfC recognize that passive financial interests can raise competitive concerns. See Federal
Trade Commission and U.S. Department of]ustice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations
Among Competitors § 3.34(c) (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/
ftcdojguidelines. pdf.
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